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Chapter 13
Tax Issues and Life Care Annuities
David Brazell, Jason Brown, and Mark Warshawsky
A life care annuity (LCA) is an integrated insurance product consisting of
life annuity and long-term care insurance (LTCI) segments. It addresses
inefficiencies in the separate private markets for its component parts—
adverse selection, which increases the price of life annuities, and strict
underwriting, which restricts the availability of LTCI. In this chapter, we
argue that, by lowering prices and increasing availability, an LCA may be
more attractive to retirees making critical choices in financing their lifetime
retirement spending and insuring against the bankrupting contingency of
severe disability. This attractiveness, in turn, may decrease pressures on
government social insurance and welfare programs, such as Social Security
and Medicaid, which are already underfinanced. This chapter first explains
the present and future tax treatment of the LCA, both as an after-tax
product and in a qualified retirement plan, and then turns to describe the
product idea and its motivation in more detail.
Description of, and Motivation for,
a Life Care Annuity
In return for the payment of one or more premium charges, an LCA
product will pay a stream of fixed periodic income payments for the lifetime
of the named annuitant, and, for a higher premium charge, any named
co-annuitant survivor. These payments may be fixed in nominal terms,
increasing, or inflation indexed. In addition, the LCA pays an extra stream
(‘pop-up’) of fixed payments if the annuitant (and/or the co-annuitant)
has severe cognitive impairment or is unable to perform without substantial
human assistance at least two of the six recognized activities of daily living
(ADLs), such as walking or eating. These are the same triggers used in LTCI
policies that may be qualified under current tax law.
Because this pop-up segment of the LCA is intended to function as
comprehensive LTCI, it is important that the level of the additional layer of
payments to the disabled annuitant be sufficient to cover the extra expenses
incurred for home health care or nursing home care, perhaps increasing
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with the degree of disability and therefore the costs of providing care. Over
time, such costs of care have risen rapidly, often in excess of the rate of
general inflation, and therefore inflation-indexing or automatic increases
of the level of disability payments would seem particularly advantageous
for these segments. That being said, it is difficult to set a standard level
of payment for the LTCI portion, given substantial geographic variation
in costs of care, as well as different personal preferences and means of
payment for care (e.g., private vs shared room). Even more so, the appro-
priate or desired level of payments in the first or life-annuity segment of
the LCA will vary considerably from household to household, reflecting
preferences, means, and so on.
The premium (or premiums) charged for an LCA product would depend
on many factors. Obviously, the number of insured, and whether there
is a survivor benefit, would be influential. Risk factors such as the age(s)
of the annuitant(s) at the start of the income payments also affect the
price, but other observable risk factors may be prevented from being used
by law or by marketing acceptance. Most significantly, of course, the pre-
mium of the LCA will reflect the level of income and disability payments
being guaranteed and whether inflation indexing is to be applied to either
or both segments. The premiums charged on newly issued contracts will
change over time, inversely with movements in interest rates available in
the financial markets on fixed-income investments used to underpin the
LCA, as well as with changes in expected trends in mortality and disability
experience.
The integration of two already widely available products, life annuities
and LTCI, is intended to address inefficiencies in the separate markets
for those products. Research by Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) and by
Mitchell et al. (1999) has shown that the costs of immediate life annuities
increase by as much as 10 percent because of adverse selection by mortality
risk classes in voluntary choice situations (i.e., individuals with lower life
expectancies avoid life-annuity purchase). Using simulation analyses using
a life-cycle framework and reasonable estimates of risk aversion, this work
also showed that a large improvement in utility could be achieved by
the annuitization of assets at fair actuarial value in retirement. But this
improvement in welfare is, at least in part, blocked by market inefficiencies.
Especially for couples, deviation from fair value (i.e., loads arising from
adverse selection and marketing costs) dissuades annuity purchases (Brown
and Poterba 2000).
On the LTCI side, Murtaugh, Kemper, and Spillman (1995) show that
insurance company underwriting practices prevent 25–33 percent of the
retirement-age population (age 65–75) from purchasing individual LTCI
policies because individuals in impaired health or unhealthy lifestyles
cannot purchase LTCI. Brown and Finkelstein (2004a), using simulation
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analysis, predict a substantial willingness to pay for actuarially fair private
LTCI coverage on top of Medicaid, by individuals in most income groups.
So, here too, market inefficiencies compromise otherwise large welfare
gains available from insurance markets. Many of these research findings
about annuities and LTCI are confirmed by observations from the insur-
ance industry, including high rejection rates on LTCI policy applications
at older ages, and discussions among actuarial professionals of annuity
pricing.
Nevertheless, enhancing the attractiveness of life-annuity and LTCI cov-
erage is an important public policy issue. Employer’s provision of retire-
ment income support for workers has moved, for many, to the defined con-
tribution (DC) plan form, where a life-annuity distribution is not required
and indeed is not often even offered. Accordingly, the retiree must now
search in the voluntary individual annuity market if he or she would like to
purchase a life annuity at retirement. Even for workers covered by defined
benefit (DB) pension plans, mandatory annuitization has become less com-
mon, and therefore the scope of adverse selection may have increased.
Moreover, nearly all proposals for Social Security reform envision lower
growth in scheduled retirement benefits, that is, life-annuity payments.
Hence, the potential scope for the voluntary life-annuity market and the
resulting need to improve its efficiency may be expected to get larger still.
In 2005, the US Congress tightened eligibility for the long-term care
benefits of Medicaid because it was concerned with apparent abuses of
the spend-down eligibility requirements as well as by the runaway program
costs. Indeed, research by Brown and Finkelstein (2004b) demonstrates the
substantial crowd-out effect of Medicaid on the desire for private LTCI
coverage, even without considering possible efforts to ‘game’ the system.
Hence, as Medicaid eligibility tightens, private LTCI coverage will become
increasingly important for the lower ranges of the income and wealth
distribution, and general concern about market inefficiencies will increase.
Moreover, the conventionally proposed solutions by the insurance indus-
try given the obvious problems of tight underwriting—sales of individual
LTCI policies at young ages or employer provision of the benefit, where
underwriting is a less significant factor—have not found wide favor in the
marketplace. In addition, there is a natural focal point for the LCA in
household life-cycle planning, namely, when that household is approaching
or has just begun retirement and is considering the rest of its financial
future in a serious way.
The idea of the LCA as a product that results in a more efficient market
and better insurance product is an application of the economic insights of
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Specifically, it is a practical attempt to pro-
duce a self-sustaining pooling equilibrium that is superior to the separating
equilibria currently in existence where insurance coverage is restricted
978–0–19–954910–8 13-Ameriks-c13 OUP239-Ameriks (Typeset by SPI, Delhi) 298 of 317 February 29, 2008 17:3
298 David Brazell, Jason Brown, and Mark Warshawsky
and/or highly priced. The LCA works so as to blend the low-mortality
risks of annuity buyers who would like cheaper life annuities with the
high-disability (and -mortality) risks of those desiring, but currently denied
access to, LTCI coverage, combining these population pools of risk classes.
To the extent that there is a positive correlation between impaired health
and mortality probability, an integrated insurance product that combines
the life annuity and LTCI can draw disparate risk groups together in such a
way that there is less adverse selection and less need for strict underwriting.
In their prior work, Murtaugh, Spillman, and Wershawsky (2001) pro-
posed three hypotheses about the LCA:
1. The life expectancy of voluntary purchasers of an integrated product
will be less than that of voluntary purchasers of life annuities;
2. With minimal medical underwriting, less severe than current under-
writing for LTCI, the cost of the integrated product will be less than
the sum of the cost of the two products sold separately (here minimal
underwriting means that only those who would go immediately into
claim status for LTCI benefits, e.g., nursing home residents would be
rejected for the LCA or, alternatively, face coverage delays of, say, two
to three years); and
3. The subpopulation eligible for, and likely to be attracted to, the inte-
grated product will be larger than that eligible for, and attracted to,
the two products issued separately.
The authors’ empirical analysis suggested that only about 2 percent of
the age 65+ population would be rejected by the lower underwriting stan-
dards, as opposed to 23 percent rejected by current underwriting criteria.
The mean expected remaining life of the purchasers of the LCA at age
65 is 18 years, compared to 19.5 for current annuity purchasers. Hence,
Murtaugh, Spillman, and Wershawsky (2001) provided support for their
first and third hypotheses. They also calculated the premium at age 65 for a
unisex individual for the simplest integrated product described above, and
the authors reported that it would cost about 4 percent less than the two
products sold separately. Finally, they also gave evidence for the assertion
that a self-sustaining pooling equilibrium is likely. In particular, they showed
that those who are rejected by current LTCI underwriting, but who would
be eligible for the LCA, are made better off in simple value terms. That is,
the ratio of actuarially fair premiums for the relevant risk groups (major
illness, stroke, poor lifestyle) relative to those for the expanded purchase
pool is above one for the LTCI coverage. The pooling property of this
positive effect on value should be enhanced when the expected utility
(‘insurance’) value of LTCI coverage is considered, to say nothing of the
insurance value of having a life annuity.1
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Possible Venues for the Life Care Annuity
Next, we explore two main forms of the LCA: an individual after-tax fixed
annuity product, and a before-tax qualified retirement plan/individual
retirement annuity. Home equity extraction through reverse LCA mort-
gages should also be considered eventually, as well as variable and gift annu-
ities and other existing vehicles for distributing resources in retirement.
The LCA might be a good distribution choice for personal retirement
accounts in a reformed Social Security system.
LCAs as After-Tax Annuity Products
An LCA could be thought of as an individual immediate fixed annuity
product; if purchased with after-tax income, this would be the most direct
and straightforward application of their findings. As we explain below in
more detail, the LCA could be offered as an immediate life annuity, with
LTCI structured either as a single- or level-premium rider or as a contingent
annuity. On the other hand, the market for immediate annuities is quite
small at present. The after-tax deferred fixed annuity product which repre-
sents a much larger market could also be used as a venue for the LCA. In
practice, the life-annuity distribution option under deferred annuity con-
tracts is seldom used at present. Nonetheless, marketed deferred annuities
contain the valuable right for the insured to get a life annuity at the better
of the terms specified in the policy contract or as an immediate annuity
available in the marketplace, and this right may be used increasingly in the
future.2 Moreover, inclusion of a deferred annuity product in the broad
LCA concept framework could also result in the desirable outcome that
LTCI coverage is provided even before any life-annuity distributions are
made.
Of late, a few insurance companies have tentatively introduced product
offerings that contain certain elements of the proposed product as either
deferred or immediate annuities with LTCI riders. Reportedly, the relevant
state insurance departments were mostly satisfied with the products, but
federal tax issues with the combination product led to difficulties and ulti-
mately caused these companies to stop issuance. Nevertheless, as is detailed
below, an after-tax LCA will be more tax favored, beginning in 2010, owing
to the passage of the PPA of 2006 (P.L. 109-280).
LCAs in Connection with Qualified Retirement Plans
An LCA could take various forms in a qualified retirement plan. One
option would define it as the normal accruing benefit of a DB pension
plan, with the LTCI segment denominated as some proportion of the final
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benefit. Thus for an average-wage full-career employee, the plan could be
designed such that the level of disability-contingent benefits accrued would
be sufficient to cover nearly all expected LTC needs. Another option would
have the LCA added as an alternative choice to the DB pension plan’s
distribution options, just like various joint-and-survivor payout options are
currently available at cost. In particular, if the plan sponsor would like
to respond positively to a demand from participants for lump-sum distri-
butions or already has a lump-sum distribution choice, but is concerned
about the impact of adverse mortality selection on the cost of its annuity
offering, providing the LCA could be an effective and responsible response.
Moreover, provision through a retirement plan may be a more popular way
for employers to offer LTCI coverage to workers than through group LTCI
plans.
Similarly, if the sponsor of a DC plan offered a life-annuity distribution
option, the LCA could be added to the menu of payout choices. Life-
annuity options are currently somewhat rare in the DC context, but a few
employers are offering their workers a service of rolling over DC account
balances to pre-negotiated individual retirement annuities from one or a
few insurance companies. Others offer their workers the option of rolling
over DC account balances to the DB plans that, of course, pays out benefits
as life annuities. And, indeed, insurers are increasingly viewing retirement
plans, especially 401(k) plans, as fertile ground for new annuity products.
More broadly, it is important to consider individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) as a home for the LCA, which would open a very large market. Yet
as is explained below, various regulations may pose significant hurdles to
the LCA in qualified retirement plans, and its tax treatment under current
law is unknown or unclear, and perhaps adverse.
Table 13-1 shows total assets in various types of retirement plans and
annuities to give a sense of the relative magnitudes where the LCA could
reside. It would be even more relevant here to report accrued DB plan lia-
bilities rather than assets, but these are not readily available on a consistent
basis for state and local government plans. For private DB plans, currently,
assets are just about equal or slightly exceed accrued liabilities, according
to estimates based on financial accounting information; for government
plans, there are reports that liabilities are significantly higher than assets,
especially if these pension liabilities were to be marked to the market.
Current Tax Treatment of Life Annuities and LTCI
When Issued as Separate Contracts
Next, we turn to a discussion of tax treatment of different products under-
lying the LCA construct.
978–0–19–954910–8 13-Ameriks-c13 OUP239-Ameriks (Typeset by SPI, Delhi) 301 of 317 February 29, 2008 17:3
13 / Tax Issues and Life Care Annuities 301
Table 13-1 Total Assets in Annuities and Pension and
Retirement Plans (as of 12/31/06)
Assets (billion $)
Private DB plansa 2,308.0
Private DC plansa 4,060.0
IRA accountsa 4,232.0
Annuitiesa 1,624.0
Federal government DB plansb 918.8
Federal government DC plansb 223.5
State and local government DB plansc 2,776.0
State and local government DC plansc 240.0
Total assets 16,382.3
Sources: a Investment Company Institute (2007); b Investment
Company Institute (2007) and Thrift Savings Plan (2006) as
of 12/31/2006; c Investment Company Institute (2007), Public
Fund Survey (2007), and Watson Wyatt estimates.
After-tax Individual Life Annuity
Annuity payments from individual life annuities are treated partially as
taxable income and partially as an untaxed return of the policyholder’s
cost, or ‘investment in the contract.’ In general, an annuity’s investment in
the contract is recovered in equal increments over the annuitant’s expected
remaining life, although the details differ for ‘nonqualified’ and ‘quali-
fied’ annuities. Nonqualified annuities are those not paid from a qualified
employer plan or other qualified savings plan, such as an individual retire-
ment account (Brown et al. 1999). The investment in the contract as of
the annuity start date is used to determine the annual annuity exclusion
amount.3 It equals the sum of premiums or other consideration paid for
the contract before the annuity start date, less any refunded premiums, divi-
dends, or other amounts that were received before that date but which were
not included in gross income. Premiums paid for additional coverages (say,
disability or double indemnity coverages) are excluded from investment in
the contract.
Under the general rule for taxing nonqualified annuities, one must com-
pute the contract’s ‘expected return,’ or the total amount that annuitants
can expect to receive under the contract. For life annuities, it is obtained
by multiplying the annuity’s initial periodic (annualized) payment by the
annuitant’s life expectancy in years. The latter is determined using pub-
lished unisex tables from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).4 Published
tables are also available for determining the expected return for temporary
life annuities (where the number of total payments is limited), for joint-
and-survivor annuities (where a periodic income is paid until the death of
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one annuitant, and an equal or different amount is paid until the death of
a second annuitant), and for joint life annuities (where payments are made
only if both named annuitants remain alive). For cases not covered by the
published tables, taxpayers must request a ruling from the IRS to deter-
mine the contract’s expected return. Dividing investment in the contract
by the contract’s expected return yields the contract’s ‘exclusion percent-
age.’ This percentage is multiplied by the first regular periodic payment,
and the result is the tax-free-exclusion amount of each annuity payment.
This exclusion amount remains the same for all years, even if the annual
annuity payment changes.
Once investment in the contract is recovered through annual exclusion
amounts, then the annuity payments are fully included in gross income.
Any unrecovered investment in the contract remaining at the death of the
last annuitant is allowed as a miscellaneous itemized deduction on the last
return of the final decedent. This deduction is not subject to the usual floor
on miscellaneous deductions (equal to 2 percent of adjusted gross income
(AGI), but it is allowed only for those (deceased) taxpayers that itemize
their deductions on their final return.
For variable annuities, investment in the contract is simply divided by the
number of expected payments to yield the tax-free-exclusion amount for
each payment.5 If the annual tax-free amount is more than the payments
received for the year, then the excess may be divided by the expected
number of remaining payments, and the result added to the previously
determined exclusion amount.
Contract distributions that are not periodic annuity payments (includ-
ing policy loan proceeds) are generally taxed in full if received after the
annuity start date. If received before the annuity start date, distributions
are generally taxable, but only to the extent that the contract’s cash value
(determined immediately before the amount is received) exceeds invest-
ment in the contract at that time (i.e., such distributions are taxed on an
‘income-first’ basis). Under certain circumstances, taxable distributions not
received as an annuity payment are subject to an additional 10 percent tax.
Qualified Long-term Care Insurance Policy:
Premiums and Benefits
A qualified LTCI policy enjoys certain tax benefits under current US law.
To be qualified, the contract must meet certain conditions. Among these
is the requirement that the only insurance protection provided under the
contract is coverage of qualified long-term care services.6 An exception to
this restriction exists under current law for LTCI provided as a rider or as
part of a life-insurance contract and, after 2009, for LTCI provided as a rider
or as part of an annuity policy. In addition, the contract cannot provide a
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cash surrender value that can be borrowed, paid, assigned, or pledged as
collateral for a loan. Premium refunds and policyholder dividends must
be applied as a reduction in future premiums or as an increase in future
benefits, except when paid as a refund on the death of the insured or upon
complete surrender or cancellation of the contract. Any refund cannot
exceed the aggregate premiums paid under the contract. A qualified long-
term care contract must also meet certain consumer protection require-
ments specified in law.
A qualified LTCI policy may pay benefits on a per diem or other periodic
basis without regard to the actual long-term care expenses incurred. How-
ever, such payments are subject to a per diem limitation. This limitation is
set at $260 in 2007, and it is also indexed to the medical-care component
of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The aggregate of such LTCI benefits
must be added to any periodic ‘accelerated death’ payments received (tax-
free) by a chronically ill insured from life-insurance policies. Any excess of
the aggregate payment over the per diem limit, calculated for the period of
coverage, is treated as taxable income.
A qualified LTCI policy is treated as a health or accident insurance con-
tract, and benefit payments are treated as amounts received for personal
injuries and sickness, implying that such benefits are generally exclud-
able from taxable income. Amounts received from qualified policies are
treated as reimbursement for expenses actually incurred for medical care.
Employer-provided coverage under a qualified LTCI contract is treated as
an accident and health plan, so that employer-paid premiums are exclud-
able from employee income. Nevertheless, LTCI cannot be offered as part
of an employer cafeteria plan.
Qualified status also bestows tax benefits as regards premiums. Premiums
paid on individual qualified policies, up to specified age-based, inflation-
indexed limits, are treated as medical insurance premiums, and thus as
potentially deductible medical-care expenses. The excess of medical-care
expenses over 7.5 percent of an individual’s AGI is deductible as a ‘below-
the-line’ itemized deduction. Finally, premiums on qualified LTCI contracts
may be paid from a health savings account (HSA) established in connection
with a high-deductible health-insurance policy. Because HSA amounts are
pretax amounts, such a use of HSA funds effectively allows a full exclusion
of amounts used to pay qualified LTCI premiums.
Life Annuity and Long-term Care Insurance in a Qualified
Retirement Plan
The life annuity is currently the required default form of distribution in
qualified pension plans (i.e., DB and money purchase DC plans). There are
various regulatory requirements that must be met for distributions in this
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form. Moreover, if a DC plan offers a life annuity as a distribution option,
these requirements must also be met when a life annuity is chosen. A few
of the requirements even extend to IRAs. Interpreted strictly, some of the
requirements would likely prevent, or at least impair, the offering of an
LCA in a qualified retirement plan or as an individual retirement annuity,
and therefore legislative and/or regulatory adjustments may be needed to
facilitate LCAs within such plans.
Minimum Distribution Requirements
Minimum distribution requirements have been established under section
401(a)(9) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) to ensure that retirement
plans and IRAs serve their intended purpose to support income security
in retirement, and not as tax avoidance schemes to accumulate assets on
a favorable tax basis for wealth transfer to another generation. In general,
taxable distributions from the plan or IRA must start at retirement or age
701/2, whichever is later, and be no less than a specified percentage of
the account balance. If the distributions are in the form of a life annuity,
then, according to the regulations, all annuity payments must be nonin-
creasing or increase only in accordance with one of six specifically allowed
exceptions. For example, payments may increase in accordance with annual
increases in the CPI, or they may increase to pay higher benefits resulting
from a plan amendment.
These regulations do not contemplate distributions through an LCA,
and hence that form or product would likely be disallowed under a strict
reading of the regulation. That being said, the LCA does not appear to
fall under the concerns that originally prompted the rules—the entire
corpus of the account balance or accrued benefit is paid out over the
lifetimes of the participant and spouse under the LCA, with nothing held
back beyond any guaranteed periods chosen otherwise allowable under
the regulation. Hence, it is possible that the LCA could be included as an
allowable distribution form through an administrative process mentioned
explicitly in the minimum distribution regulation. Under that process, the
IRS Commissioner could provide more guidance on additional benefits
that may be disregarded for individual accounts, or for other methods
of increasing distributions from a pension plan. In the alternative, the
regulation itself could be amended to make the necessary allowances.7
Sex Neutral Pricing of Life Annuities
As a result of Supreme Court decisions prohibiting the use of sex-specific
mortality tables for group retirement benefits, pension plans and insurance
companies issuing annuities to participants through employer-sponsored
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retirement plans must price life annuities using unisex mortality tables and
determine benefits accordingly. This is in contrast to the general practice of
insurance companies in the individual commercial market where life annu-
ities (both on an after-tax basis and in IRAs) are priced on a sex-distinct
basis. It should be noted, however, that current commercial practice in
the individual market for LTCI is to make no distinction by sex in pricing,
despite ample evidence that women, as a class, have a significantly higher
incidence of longer LTCI claims (Murtaugh, Spillman, and Wershawsky
2001, Brown and Finkelstein 2004a). When offered as an employee benefit,
LTCI clearly has to be priced on a unisex basis, by force of law, as would the
LCA.
This legal requirement for unisex pricing could vitiate some of the
reduction in adverse selection that is one of the goals of the LCA, as a
unisex-priced product is more attractive to women than to men. That being
said, the effect may be small, as most workers approaching retirement are
married, and another legal requirement, explained immediately below,
encourages the selection of joint-and-survivor annuities. Of course, the
individual nonemployer market is not subject to the unisex rulings of the
Supreme Court, and therefore is affected only indirectly, if at all, by those
rulings.
Joint-and-Survivor Requirement
All tax-qualified pension plans provide that retirement benefits payable
as a life annuity to an employee married to his or her current spouse
for at least one year will be automatically paid in the form of a qualified
joint-and-survivor annuity, unless the participant elects otherwise with the
consent of the spouse. There are multiple provisions in law and regula-
tion to ensure that surviving spouses receive more than a token stream
of income from the annuity. DC plans must also follow these rules if
they offer an annuity as a distribution option and the participant elects
it. The rules do not apply, however, to IRAs and individual retirement
annuities.
Again, these rules do not envision an LCA as a distribution option, and
hence it is unclear if and how these requirements would be applied to the
LCA. It is possible, but uncertain, that a regulatory interpretation would
arise having the joint-and-survivor requirements applied just to the life-
annuity segment of the integrated form, thereby leaving the plan partici-
pant in control of the choice whether the LTCI segment, as an ancillary
benefit, was to just the participant or also for the spouse.8 Alternatively,
rules could be written to reflect a public policy desire so that a joint-
and-survivor requirement similar to current law should apply to the LTCI
segment as well.
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Incidental Benefits
In recognition of their tax-advantaged status and to focus their design and
activities on certain desired public policy goals, Treasury and the IRS, even
before the passage of ERISA in 1974, limited employer-sponsored retire-
ment plans to certain types of benefits. In general, medical benefits may
only be provided if they are subordinate to the plan’s retirement benefits
and are paid from a separate account established for such benefits. Without
language in existing laws and regulations specifically referring to LCAs,
it is not immediately clear how the IRS would view the LCA as part of
a qualified retirement plan. It is possible that it would regard the LTCI
segment of the LCA as akin to disability benefits and therefore allowed
as a customary pension benefit. Yet such benefits are usually considered
for workers who retire because of a disability, not people who encounter a
disability subsequent to retiring.
Alternatively, the IRS might take the view that the LTCI segment is a type
of retiree health insurance, and hence, as long as it is ‘incidental’ to the
retirement benefits, it would be permitted. In a pension plan, the LTCI seg-
ment would be allowed under the specific requirements of section 401(h)
(e.g., a separate account, specified benefits), or in a profit-sharing plan
(most section 401(k) plans are profit-sharing plans), it would apparently
be more generically allowed. Also asset transfers under section 420 from
an overfunded pension plan might be allowed to pay for the premiums for
the LTCI segment of the LCA. A requirement for section 401(h) treatment
of the LTCI segment of an annuity distribution form in a pension plan,
however, would be inconsistent with an optional distribution mechanism—
the most likely design to be embraced by plan sponsors.
The IRS could alternatively take the position that the LCA as part of
a retirement plan was not envisioned by these regulations and hence it
would need a more formal and well-defined clearance by a change in the
incidental benefit regulation or legislation.
‘Current Law’ Taxation of the LCA in a Qualified Retirement Plan
On the bold assumption that the various regulatory challenges mentioned
above (some of which are themselves related closely to tax treatment)
facing the inclusion of the LCA in a qualified retirement plan or IRA were
surmounted, what would be the likely current law tax treatment of the LCA
premium and the life-annuity payments and LTCI benefits in that venue?
To the extent that employer and employee contributions to the retirement
plan or IRA were made on a pretax basis, then obviously all the payments
from the life-annuity segment would be included in taxable income. What
about the benefits from the LTCI segment? It is possible that the benefits
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could be treated exactly as an incidental disability benefit (‘contingent
annuity’) from the plan and therefore included in taxable income, but
not triggering a taxable distribution from the plan for the payment of a
premium charge. Or benefits could be treated as a separate stand-alone
qualified LTCI policy, where benefits are not included in taxable income,
without triggering a distribution from the plan.
The allowance of ‘health insurance’ tax treatment outside of section
401(h) would require a bold interpretation by the IRS that, in the absence
of a clear statement of law, the LTCI segment of the LCA in a retirement
plan should receive ‘all-in’ tax treatment more favorable than that of a
stand-alone qualified LTCI policy. It may be unlikely that the IRS, on its
own, would allow a situation where the LTCI segment premiums would
be essentially deductible (a full ‘above-the-line’ deduction) and benefits
not included in taxable income. This would require the IRS to grant tax
treatment superior to a qualified LTCI policy, under which premiums are
rarely deductible, and then only subject to specified limits. The IRS would
also note the provision in the PPA, mentioned below, that the favorable tax
treatment of the LCA issued in an after-tax individual annuity is not avail-
able in employer plans and IRAs. On the other hand, employer payments
for LTCI premiums in a group insurance plans or through HSAs and health
reimbursement arrangements are not included in employee income and
the IRS could find some comfort for favorable treatment there.
A different outcome would be one where the premiums for the LTCI
segment would be considered to represent taxable distributions from the
plan. In this case, the LTCI premiums might or might not be deductible
from income (depending on the individual’s income and tax situation
and whether the LTCI policy was considered qualified) and benefits, as
insurance would not be included in income.
The treatment of benefits is also unclear if the LTCI segment does not
represent a qualified LTCI policy. The tax code is silent as to the treatment
of benefits received from nonqualified LTCI contracts. It is possible that, as
payments to retirees, they could be treated simply as taxable distributions
from the plan. In this case, however, the amount of unreimbursed medical-
care expenses would be higher, and the probability of deducting that larger
amount would be fairly high for most people. For certain taxpayers, how-
ever, the loss of the standard deduction, a need to itemize deductions on
their tax return, and the lack of a deduction equal to 7.5 percent of AGI
are significant considerations. In addition, for some taxpayers, an increase
in their gross income will increase the amount of Social Security benefits
that are included in taxable income, and this distinction would become
important, as we show below. In addition, if payments from the LTCI
segment take the form of per diem or other periodic payments which are
higher than the costs of qualified long-term services, then the question of
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the contract being qualified or not may be important; the excess payment
amounts might be taxed if the policy were nonqualified, tax exempt if
qualified and not too large.
As is illustrated below, this tax treatment would be inferior to the treat-
ment provided under the PPA of 2006 to the LTCI segment of an after-tax,
nonqualified, LCA issued after 2009. It is also inferior to an IRS position
under which the LCA would be considered, not as an insurance policy, but
as a contingent annuity. Finally, it would be inferior to the proposed policy
that provided an ‘above-the-line’ deduction of LTCI premiums from gross
income. The PPA provides an income tax exclusion for pension distribu-
tions that are used to pay for qualified health insurance premiums up to
a maximum of $3,000 annually. This exclusion is available only to retired
or disabled public safety officers but may be used for health insurance or
LTCI. This is equivalent to an above-the-line deductibility of LTCI premi-
ums, and, it is, by far, the most generous tax treatment currently available.
It remains to be seen whether this limited PPA treatment will serve as a
model in future legislation for the tax treatment of LTCI, whether as part
of a LCA, or, otherwise, for a more widely defined set of retirees.
Tax Treatment of Life Annuities and LTCI When
Combined in an After-Tax Product
Next, we turn to a discussion of tax treatment of different LTCI and annuity
products when they are combined in an after-tax vehicle.
Life Care Annuity (Treatment through 2009)
Under current US law, combining an LTCI product with an annuity auto-
matically causes the LTCI product to be nonqualified. It is clear that this
denies an itemized medical-care deduction for any recognized LTCI premi-
ums. However, a reasonable argument may be made for treating an LCA
as a single (contingent) annuity contract. In this case, the cash premiums
paid into the contract (whether funding the annuity portion or the LTCI
portion) would constitute the annuity’s investment in the contract, and
thus would be excludable over the expected remaining life of the policy-
holder. In addition, under this single contract concept, there might not
be any tax consequence associated with charges against annuity cash values
for LTCI coverage. There is a question, however, as to whether the expected
LTCI benefits should be taken into account in determining the contract’s
expected return. If added to the expected return, they would lower the
annual exclusion amount; and recovery of investment in the contract could
occur over a period of years in excess of the owner’s expected remaining
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life. In the illustrations presented below, we have not included the contin-
gent payments in the LCA’s expected return.
A life-insurance contract combined with LTCI is treated as two separate
policies under current law. This will also be true for a combined annuity-
LTC contract after 2009 under the PPA. An inference might be made,
therefore, that such treatment should apply to such combined policies
under current law. In this case, it is possible that premiums, investment in
the contract, and cash value of an LCA might have to be allocated between
the annuity and long-term care portions.9 Also, LTCI charges against the
annuity’s cash value would likely be viewed as taxable distributions from
the contract.
It is unclear as to how benefits of a nonqualified LTCI contract are
treated. While the tax code specifies that benefits from a qualified LTCI
contract are to be treated ‘as amounts received for personal injuries
and sickness and shall be treated as reimbursement for expenses actually
incurred for medical care,’ the code is silent regarding the treatment of
benefits from nonqualified long-term care contracts. Even less clear is the
treatment of per diem payments from nonqualified LTCI. In the analysis
below, we treat indemnity benefits generally as being bona fide insurance
reimbursements for medical care, but are conspicuously silent regarding
the legal status of per diem payments. Alternatively, we could have assumed
that payments from nonqualified LTCI are treated simply as additions
to gross income, potentially allowing greater itemized deductions for the
costs of long-term care services. This view is adopted when analyzing the
‘contingent annuity’ below.
Life Care Annuity (Treatment after 2009)
The PPA altered the treatment of LTCI when combined with an annu-
ity. In particular, it explicitly allows LTCI (whether qualified or not) to
be offered by rider or as part of either a life-insurance contract or an
annuity contract. In this case, the portion of the contract providing long-
term care coverage is treated as a separate contract, but the law is silent
as to whether this separate treatment requires an allocation of contract
premiums or cash values.10 The relevant provisions of the Act generally
apply to contracts issued after 1996, but only with respect to taxable years
beginning after 2009. Thus, although state regulators have the ultimate
authority in approving insurance products, the PPA acknowledges that such
a combined product can exist after 2009 without the LTCI portion losing
its tax qualified status. This treatment, however, has not been extended to
employer plans and other tax-exempt trusts, to IRAs or annuities, or to
contracts purchased by an employer for the benefit of the employee or his
or her spouse.
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The PPA provides that any charges against the cash value of an annuity
contract or life-insurance contract for coverage under a qualified LTCI
contract will not be includable in taxable income. Such premium charges
will not be treated as medical expenses for purposes of the itemized
medical-care deduction, and the investment in the contract of the annuity
or life-insurance policy will be reduced by the amount of the charge. The
premium charge continues to be tax-exempt even if the investment in the
contract is zero. Only under this circumstance will the provision provide an
exclusion for the full amount of qualified long-term care premiums.
While clarifying the treatment of LTCI premiums that take the form
of explicit charges against the cash value of the annuity or life-insurance
contract, the PPA’s language is less illuminating regarding the treatment
of a policy that is not a rider with explicit charges, or of cases where the
full cost of LTCI is not embedded in the specified rider charges. For LCAs,
the more premium that one can allocate to the annuity’s investment in the
contract, the greater the tax savings will be.
Possible Structures of the Life Care Annuity
and Illustrations of Tax Treatment
There are several different ways in which the LCA could be structured, and
the particular format may influence its tax treatment.
LCA structures
One can imagine at least three different ways of integrating the LTCI policy
with an annuity. One way is to set up the LCA as a life annuity with a
single-premium LTCI policy rider. As such, an annuity is purchased, from
which an immediate charge against it is made for the purchase of an LTCI
policy. Subsequently, no more charges are made against the annuity for
LTCI premiums. Another way of structuring the LCA is as a life annuity
with an LTCI policy rider with an annual premium. As with the single-
premium LTCI rider, charges are made against the annuity cash value to
finance LTCI premiums, but the charges are made over the life of the
policyholder. That the premium is not paid fully up front would presumably
allow greater flexibility for either the policyholder or the insurer should
future circumstances change. A final way of structuring the policy is as a
contingent annuity, in which payments rise in the event of disability, but
there is no explicit purchase of an LTCI rider. Such a policy would require
an initial premium roughly comparable to that of a life annuity with a
single-premium LTCI rider.
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Illustrations
How the LCA is structured could play a large role in determining how it
would be taxed. Furthermore, individual characteristics, particularly Social
Security benefits, other sources of income, and health-care expenditures,
also play a key role in determining how taxable income varies. A couple of
simple illustrations bear this out.
In this exercise, two individuals are considering the purchase of the LCA
whose LTC portion is organized in one of the three ways described in the
prior section. The first way is as a level-premium LTCI rider, the second way
is as a single-premium LTCI rider, the third way is as a contingent annuity
that is treated as an annuity contract by the IRS. The issue of premium
savings arising from purchasing an LTCI policy in conjunction with a life
annuity is ignored here, as all policies can be assumed to be part of an
LCA. Thus, we assume that the LCA pays nothing beyond what is required
to finance LTCI premiums or benefits.
All three LTCI arrangements are assumed to be purchased by a single
individual at age 65. They pay out $140/day, with 5 percent annual infla-
tion compounding, in the event long-term care services are needed; these
payouts are assumed to cover exactly the cost of qualified long-term care
services. The expected present discounted value of the policy, in all cases,
is $45,583. Thus, the single-premium LTCI policy and the LTCI portion of
the contingent annuity will cost $45,583 up front, and the level-premium
policy will cost $4,008 annually. In order to fund this level premium, the
up-front cost of the LCA must be increased by $45,583, given the assumed
mortality and morbidity assumptions.
Projected utilization is assumed to be a function of mortality. Each
claim is expected to last for 760 days, spanning three years’ time. Those
who encounter disability are assumed to die at the end of the third year.
Additionally, each individual is assumed to have $1,200 in unreimbursed
medical expenses each year, not associated with qualified long-term care
services. Each individual is assumed to purchase a life annuity at the same
time that costs $136,300, which pays $12,000 annually. Other income is
assumed constant over time, except for Social Security benefits, which are
assumed to grow at 2 percent per year. Long-term care deductibility limits,
which are $2,950 annually for 61- to 70-year-olds and $3,680 for 71-year-olds
and older, are expected to increase at 4 percent per year. The discount rate
is assumed to be 6 percent.
The first individual, characterized as having moderate income, is
assumed to start with $12,000 in Social Security benefits and $7,000 in
other taxable income. The second individual, characterized as being of
high income, receives $75,000 annually in additional taxable income. For
the high-income individual, the issue of taxable Social Security benefits is
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ignored, because this individual would be subject to the maximum tax rate
for Social Security benefits in every year. As mentioned above, each individ-
ual also receives $12,000 (nonindexed) in individual annuity income.
This exercise estimates taxable income for the two individuals under the
three different structures of LCA in three different regimes: before the
implementation of the PPA, after implementation of PPA, and if, instead,
LTCI premiums were subject to an above-the-line deduction. Over the past
several session of Congress, above-the-line deductions for LTCI premiums
have been proposed. This would allow all individuals to deduct LTCI pre-
miums up to the annual cap regardless of whether they itemized their
deductions or of whether their medical expenses exceeded 7.5 percent of
AGI.
The tax impact is calculated relative to that where an immediate life-
annuity policy and a qualified single-premium LTCI policy are purchased
as separate contracts, under the (unrealistic) assumption that the aggregate
pretax cost of the two separate policies equals the pretax cost of the LCA.
Under this baseline, the moderate-income individual is able to deduct
some medical expenses in the first year, because the sum of other medical
expenses and tax deductible LTCI premiums in the first year exceeds 7.5
percent of AGI. The high-income individual cannot deduct any LTCI pre-
miums. Table 13-2 shows the tax impact of the different scenarios relative
to the baseline, with the tax impact measured as the differences in the
actuarial present value of each individual’s tax liabilities for the expected
remaining lifetime.11
Under current law (pre-PPA), purchasing the LCA with a level-premium
LTCI rider will increase taxable income relative to purchasing separate
single-premium contracts. The annuity generates a return that is taxable,
Table 13-2 Net Effect on Taxable Income of Purchasing Lifetime Care
Annuity Under Different Arrangements
Moderate Income Level Premium ($) Single Premium ($) Contingent ($)
LTCI Policy LTCI Policy Annuity
Before 2010 22,568 31,139 (17,657)
After 2009 (3,267) (3,806) (3,806)
w/ATL deduction (23,590) 28,189 (17,657)
High Income
Before 2010 15,878 15,878 (23,787)
After 2009 (8,571) (8,286) (8,286)
w/ATL deduction (25,137) 12,928 (23,787)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: LTCI policy refers to a long-term care insurance policy; ATL Deduction
refers to an above-the-line deduction.
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subject to the exclusion over time of the initial LCA premium, and the
LTCI premiums are treated as a taxable distribution from the annuity, and
thus includable as income.12 For the moderate-income individual, the addi-
tional income paid out by the annuity increases the taxable Social Security
benefits. The result is, in expectation, an increase in taxable income of
$22,568 for the moderate-income individual, and an increase of $15,878
for the high-income individual.
The PPA will allow the exclusion of the distributions from the annu-
ity cash value used to pay for the level-premium LTCI, a considerable
tax benefit relative to current law. The corresponding reduction in the
investment in the contract accelerates the exhaustion of that investment
in the contract. For the moderate-income individual, this translates to a
slight increase in the expected taxable Social Security benefits, and a slight
reduction in other deductible medical expenses. Overall, the net impact is a
reduction in taxable income of $3,267 for the moderate-income individual
and a net reduction in taxable income of $8,571 for the high-income
individual.
To model the effects of an above-the-line deduction for LTCI premiums,
we imagine how above-the-line deductibility to LCAs before the imple-
mentation of PPA might have been granted. We posit that charges against
annuities for the purposes of paying LTCI premiums would be fully taxable,
but the premiums would be deductible above-the-line up to the annual
cap on deductible LTCI premiums. The original investment in the annu-
ity contract would be excluded over the expected remaining lifetime of
the annuitant; but charges for LTCI premiums would not accelerate the
exhaustion of that investment as under PPA. Consequently, an above-the-
line deduction of LTCI premiums would further increase tax benefits
conferred upon the level-premium LTCI policy. Deductibility of premiums
above the line would reduce taxable income, increasing the amount of
other deductible medical expenses for the moderate-income individual.
And deductibility of premiums would not require an offsetting reduction in
annuity basis, which would be excluded over the expected remaining life-
time of the individual. The net reduction in taxable income is substantial:
for the moderate-income individual it is $23,590, and for the high-income
individual, it is $25,137.
Single-premium policies, both before and after implementation of the
PPA, receive similar tax treatment as level-premium policies. Before 2010,
charges against the annuity for the single LTCI premium are included in
taxable income. Because the charge is so large, for the moderate-income
individual, Social Security benefits are taxable in the first year. For the
high-income individual, the net effect on taxable income is identical for
the single-premium LTCI policy and the level-premium LTCI policy. As
with the level-premium policy, after 2010, the charge against the annuity for
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the LTCI policy is not taxable. There are some minor differences between
LCAs with level-premium LTCI riders and those with single-premium LTCI
riders as regards the timing of the exhaustion of investment in the contract
which has minor ripple effects on deductibility of other medical expenses
and taxable Social Security benefits. But the overall effect is to improve the
tax treatment for the LCAs with single-premium LTCI riders relative to the
baseline by roughly the same magnitude as LCAs with level-premium LTCI
riders. However, extending an above-the-line deduction for LTCI premiums
that supersede the relevant measures in the PPA causes the LCA to be
treated much as it would under current law, with the exception of a one-
year deduction of the capped limit on LTCI premium, currently $2,950 for
a 65-year-old.
The contingent annuity, assuming it is viewed strictly as an annuity by the
IRS, before 2010, would receive considerably more favorable tax treatment
than the other two arrangements. Unlike with policies that require taxable
charges to finance LTCI premiums, the entire premium is excludable as
investment basis over the course of the remaining life of the annuitant. This
exclusion lowers taxable Social Security benefits for the moderate-income
individual in years without disability. If payouts are made, additional Social
Security benefits become taxable for that individual. And the payouts raise
taxable income considerably, but most of them are deductible because qual-
ified medical expenses easily exceed 7.5 percent of AGI in those years. Pro-
jected taxable income falls by $17,657 for the moderate-income individual
and $23,787 for the high-income individual. The PPA, however, uses broad
language in defining insurance coverage as part of an annuity contract,
raising the question of whether the IRS would allow a contingent annuity
to be defined as strictly an annuity contract without an LTCI component.
If the IRS requires this to be treated as two separate contracts, then the
taxation of the product would likely be the same as for a life annuity with a
single-premium LTCI rider, as shown in Table 13-2. Because we model the
effects of allowing an above-the-line deduction for LTC insurance before
implementation of PPA, we show that the tax treatment of the contingent
annuity under above-the-line deductibility of insurance premiums would
revert back to the pre-2010 treatment, before the product was assumed to
have an LTCI component.
It would seem that the contingent annuity would offer more favorable
tax treatment for anyone before the implementation of the PPA. Yet in the
absence of clear guidance from the IRS, insurers may be fearful that such
a product would not be granted the tax advantages detailed here. After the
implementation of PPA, however, LCAs with traditional LTCI policy riders
are clearly granted considerably more tax advantages than are currently
available. Above-the-line deductibility would increase the tax advantages
further for LCAs with level-premium LTCI policy riders.
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Conclusions
Combining LTCI with an immediate life annuity into a single policy, the
LCA, will result in a lower total price for the combined product less adverse
selection in the individual annuity market, and greater availability of long-
term care to more retired households, when compared to offering the
two products separately. This chapter discusses two principal venues in
which this product might be marketed: a qualified retirement plan, and
an after-tax individual annuity. We explain both the tax and the regulatory
treatment afforded to the product, highlighting the uncertainties that arise
largely because of the different tax and regulatory treatments of stand-
alone annuities and LTCI policies.
Looking ahead, we argue that the PPA will make the LCA a tax-preferred
way of obtaining LTCI coverage, but that an above-the-line deduction of
qualified LTCI premiums would provide an even greater tax preference.
Such a preference was recently bestowed on distributions from qualified
retirement plans of public safety officers used to purchase qualified LTCI.
Notes
1 Moreover, sensitivity analysis demonstrated that the likely ‘wood-work’ effect on
disability claims, as well as inflation indexing of the LTCI segment, increase value
to those currently rejected by LTCI underwriting, and therefore further support
the second maintained hypothesis that the integrated product will be cheaper and
more desired, in a self-sustaining pooling equilibrium.
2 The recently enacted PPA of 2006 expanded the tax-free exchange provisions
contained in the IRC. After 2009, a policyholder will be able to exchange tax-
free both a deferred annuity and a deferred annuity-LTCI integrated product for
an immediate annuity-LTCI integrated product (or a stand-alone LTCI contract).
However, the policyholder will not be able to exchange tax-free a stand-alone LTCI
contract for an LCA.
3 The annuity start date is generally the first day of the first period for which one
receives an annuity payment under the contract (which may be earlier than the date
of the first payment).
4 In general, for contracts under which all contributions were made prior to June
30, 1986, the annuitant must use sex-based tables published by the IRS. However,
for annuity payments received after that date, the annuitant can make a one-time
election to use the unisex tables.
5 This is similar to the simplified method used for taxing payments from qualified
annuities, although different tables are used to determine the number of expected
payments.
6 Qualified long-term care services are necessary services (including personal care
services) that are required by a chronically ill individual and are provided pursuant
to a plan of care prescribed by a licensed health-care practitioner. A chronically
ill individual is one that is generally unable to perform at least two out of six
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listed ADL for a period of at least 90 days due to a loss of functional capacity, or
one that requires substantial supervision due to severe cognitive impairment. To
qualify as an itemized medical-care deduction, a qualified long-term care service
cannot be performed by a spouse or other relative (unless such person is a licensed
professional with respect to the service).
7 The PPA of 2006 allows the combination of an annuity with an LTCI contract
after 2009. It further states that the LTCI component will be treated as a separateAu: please
check the
change of
acronym
from ‘LCTI’
to ‘LTCI’.
contract, which seemingly would allow the minimum distribution rules to apply only
to the life-annuity segment of a qualified plan LCA. However, the Act also states that
a qualified employer plan or individual retirement account is not to be treated as
an annuity contract for the purpose of the above separate contract rule, so that the
impact of the Act on the issue at hand is somewhat unclear.
8 This treatment would be similar to how the required minimum distribution rules
treat a plan that also offers a disability pension—the disability benefit is considered
separate from the retirement benefit. But the analogy may be stretched too far, as
the IRS has taken the position that disability benefits cease once the participant
attains the normal retirement age stated in the plan.
9 Such allocations are not explicitly required under current law or the PPA. How-
ever, under an allocation regime, there would be an incentive to overstate the
annuity’s share of premiums, so as to maximize the amount of premiums that could
be recovered through the annuity exclusion ratio.
10 As under current law with respect to life-insurance combined products, ‘portion’
is defined as ‘only the terms and benefits that are in addition to the terms and
benefits under a life-insurance contract or annuity contract without regard to long-
term care insurance coverage.’
11 In these illustrations, the ‘Before 2010’ entries are computed on the basis that
the PPA was not enacted. That is, under the PPA, the tax treatment of a contract
issued after 1996 will change in 2010; we assume that it will not.
12 We consider payouts for LTC services under the single-premium and level-
premium riders as reimbursement for qualified LTC services, and thus excludable
from taxable income. If the IRS considered the LTCI riders in either the single-
premium or level-premium examples as components of an annuity, however, pay-
outs from the LTC component would not be considered as reimbursements from
an insurance policy, and the amount would be fully taxable. Nonetheless, LTC
expenses would be deductible to the extent qualified medical expenses exceeded
7.5 percent of AGI, so the net tax impact would only be slightly higher than the
amounts shown in the table.
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